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INTRODUCTION

The Illinois Appellate Court in Estate of Howell correctly
reversed the trial court’s holding that would have forced a disabled
adult to create an estate plan against his own wishes and best
interests.1 Had the trial court’s holding stood, the disabled adult’s
estate plan would need to follow the rules of intestacy, causing a
majority of his multi-million dollar estate to be distributed upon his
death to a neglectful father as well as ten half-siblings he never
met.2 Instead, the court on appeal reversed the lower court in favor
of the disabled adult, whose name is Donald Howell (hereinafter
“Donald”), because the trial court imposed a limit on Donald and his
guardians that was not intended in the probate act.3 The appellate
court allowed Donald’s guardian to make an estate plan on his
behalf using a sensible standard—the hierarchical substituted
judgment and best interests rule—a standard instituted only in
Illinois and the District of Columbia.4 The Illinois standard permits
guardians to create a desirable and feasible estate plan for those
like Donald in a manner greater than any other state standard in
America.5
Disabled Americans, many of which require assistance in
making crucial decisions,6 make up nearly twenty percent of the
* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2017, The John Marshall Law School,
Chicago, Illinois, Bachelor of Science in Public Affairs, Certification in Business
Foundations, May 2014, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. I first
would like to thank my parents for supporting me and my decision to pursue
law school—you gave me the opportunity to obtain my dreams and realize my
full potential. I would like to thank the members of the John Marshall Law
Review, notably my editors and fellow board members, for providing a scholarly
and great community to be part of. I would like to give a very special thanks to
my incredible girlfriend, Lorre, who always motivates me through tough times
and never once stopped supporting me. Finally, I would like to thank my kitty,
Indy, and my beagle, Bernie, for giving me much comfort and fuzziness.
1. Estate of Howell v. Howell, 36 N.E.3d 293, 305 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
2. Id. at 296 (stating that “if [the disabled adult] were to die survived by his
parents and half-siblings, the parents and siblings would inherit [the disabled
adult’s] intestate property in equal shares.”).
3. Id. at 305 (holding that the coguardians’ statutory interpretation was
reasoned and that the trial court “imposed limitations on the guardians’ actions
which were not intended by legislature.”).
4. 755 ILCS 5/11a-18(a)-(a-5) (2015) (stating that a guardian may “exercise
any or all powers over the estate and business affairs of the disabled adult that
the disabled adult could exercise if present and not under disability” and that
“[t]he court may approve the making on behalf of the disabled adult of such
agreements as the court determines to be for the disabled adult’s best
interests.”). The court in Estate of Howell interpreted 5/11a-18 to require an
estate planning approach that “follow[s] the disabled adult’s subjective wishes,
to the extent those wishes can be ascertained, but the overriding principal is to
act in the disabled adult’s objective ‘best interests.’”. Estate of Howell, 36 N.E.3d
at 300.
5. See infra Part III.
6. For example, courts agree that the mentally impaired are entitled to the
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country’s population.7 To ensure satisfactory decision-making for a
disabled adult, guardians are appointed to improve a disabled
adult’s limited lifestyle and help with routine tasks such as getting
the disabled adult dressed or helping the disabled adult use the
bathroom.8 Under statute, an Illinois court may appoint a guardian
for a variety of a disabled adult’s needs, 9 including representation
in legal matters,10 management of finances and business,11 and
establishing custody of and caring for the disabled adult. 12 In light
of the Illinois Appellate Court’s ruling in Estate of Howell, the
protections of disabled adults are enhanced and ensures equitable
and fair outcomes with proper guardianship actions.13 The
individual opportunity for the disabled adult’s wishes to be
manifested comes from the guardian’s assistance and
representation, which is the catalyst for such an opportunity.
However, even though the case of Estate of Howell may have an

same rights of a competent person in making crucial decisions regarding
abortion and life-sustaining treatment, even if the mentally disabled are unable
to make the decision for themselves. See Norman Cantor, The Relation Between
Autonomy-Based Rights and Profoundly Mentally Disabled Persons, 13 ANN.
HEALTH 37, 37 (2004) (referring to an individual’s constitutional right to make
crucial medical decisions).
7. Prevalence of Disability for Selected Age Groups: 2005 and 2010, in
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 2010 HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STUDIES No. 1, 4
(Dep’t of Commerce 2010).
8. A census regarding Americans with disabilities states that 9.4 million
disabled adults (3.9 percent of the U.S. population) are challenged in performing
activities necessary to living, such as getting out of bed and practicing good
hygiene, while 15.5 million people (6.4 percent of the U.S. population) struggle
and need assistance with activities instrumental to daily living, including
managing their money and taking prescription medication. DEP’T. OF
COMMERCE, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 2010 HOUSEHOLD ECONOMICS
STUDIES 70-131 (2012).
9. As the role of the court in supervising a disabled adult is reduced, the
fiduciary duty placed upon the guardian increases. See Karen Boxx and Terry
Hammond, Symposium: Third National Guardianship Summit: Standards Of
Excellence: A Call for Standards: An Overview of the Current Status and Need
for Guardian Standards of Conduct and Codes of Ethics, 2012 UTAH L. REV.
1207, 1215-17 (2012) (reasoning that more guardians are appointed without
close court supervision due to a decrease in the court’s resources to finance
supervision).
10. See 755 ILCS 5/1-2.08 (2015) (stating that a “[g]uardian includes a
representative of a minor and a representative of a person under legal
disability.”); see also Rucker v. Rucker, 23 N.E.3d 442, 451 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)
(describing the relationship of a guardian to a disabled adult is akin to a trustee
and beneficiary, where a guardian must manage a disabled adult’s estate “with
the same degree of vigilance, diligence and prudence as a reasonable person
would use in managing his own property.”).
11. 755 ILCS 5/11a-18 (2015).
12. 755 ILCS 5/11a-17 (2015).
13. Estate of Howell v. Howell, 36 N.E.3d 293, 305 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)
(holding that the coguardians’ statutory interpretations were reasoned and that
the trial court “imposed limitations on the guardians’ actions which were not
intended by legislature.”).
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impact on rights and privileges of the nearly 1.3 million disabled
individuals and their guardians that reside in Illinois,14 many states
unfortunately do not have a statute that provides similar protection
for a disabled adult’s estate.15
This Comment shall discuss and evaluate the guardianship
decision-making standard implemented in Estate of Howell as it
relates to guardianships of disabled persons, and why Illinois has
the best scheme for safeguarding the assets of a disabled adult when
a guardian creates an estate plan on his or her behalf. 16 The
discussion is based on the holding in Estate of Howell that a
guardian may act on behalf of the disabled adult’s interests and
therefore the disabled adult’s last will and testament need not
conform to the rules of intestacy, because of the hierarchical
substituted judgment and best interests rule (sometimes
hereinafter “the hierarchical standard”). 17 The Comment will also
discuss the rules of intestacy and why other jurisdictions should
change their laws to model Illinois’s laws, which reflect today’s
modern family views on disinheriting undeserving family members
of the decedent.
The background in Part II discusses Estate of Howell and
applicable Illinois law regarding guardianships, intestacy,
neglectful parents, and the hierarchical standard. Next, the
analysis in Part III contrasts Illinois probate law with probate law
of other states to demonstrate the impact of different decisionmaking models used in America. The analysis also compares Illinois
and other jurisdictions’ rules of intestacy to highlight Illinois
policies that, ensures a decedent’s inheritance descends only to
deserving family members. Finally, the proposal in Part IV
advocates for other American jurisdictions to adopt not only the
hierarchical standard, but also the protections in the Illinois
probate code that ensures descendible assets shall not pass to a
blood-related family member whom has provided neither care nor
affection for his or her child.

14. See LEE ERICKSON & S. VON SCHRADER, 2008 DISABILITY STATUS
REPORT: ILLINOIS, CORNELL UNIVERSITY REHABILITATION RESEARCH AND
TRAINING CENTER ON DISABILITY DEMOGRAPHICS AND STATISTICS 7 (2010)
(listing the percentage of each state population that has disabilities). This
number includes all types of disabilities at all ages within Illinois. Id. Illinois
citizens with cognitive disabilities similar to Donald, who are placed within the
age group of 21-64 and number in the 600,000s, totals 3.3% of the Illinois
population. Id at 7.
15. See infra Part III.A.1.
16. Estate of Howell, 36 N.E.3d at 305-06. This case is a case of first
impression in Illinois where the coguardians were unable to rely on pre-existing
case law. Id. at 306.
17. Id. at 298, 303.
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II. CREATING AN ESTATE PLAN FOR DISABLED ADULTS
UNDER GUARDIANSHIP IN LIGHT OF ESTATE OF HOWELL
AND MISBEHAVING HEIRS
A. Guardianship of a Disabled Adult
and Guardian Decision-Making
The responsibilities of a guardian in Illinois has developed over
time to best serve the needs of a disabled person because the law
places a duty on guardians to use good judgment when making his
or her decisions based on their own best interests, but only if the
disabled adult’s testamentary wishes cannot be ascertained.18 The
background first discusses guardianship and the hierarchical
standard, followed by a discussion regarding the rules of intestacy
and actions affecting heirs’ rights to receive a distribution through
intestacy.
1. Past and Present: Guardianship Over a Disabled
Person’s Estate in Illinois
When the court determines that a person has a disability that,
renders one unable to manage their estate or own well-being,19 the
court appoints a guardian to step in and manage that person’s
affairs.20 This approach to guardianship traces its beginnings to
ancient Rome,21 and was later adopted during the times of medieval
Britain, where the crown took the responsibility upon itself to
represent incompetent persons under the tenet of parens patriae.22
States have adopted and codified this ideal using various general
approaches.23 The guardian’s responsibilities and guidelines to

18. See infra Part II.A.3.
19. See 755 ILCS 5/11a-3(a)(2015)(stating that a petition for adjudication of
disability requires “by clear and convincing evidence that a person is a person
with a disability.”); see also 755 ILCS 5/11a-2 (2016)(defining the attributes of
one with a disability).
20. 5/11a-3(a)(2015). A guardianship is used only to “promote the well-being
of the disabled person, to protect him from neglect, exploitation, or abuse” and
shall be ordered to represent the disabled adult “only to the extent necessitated
by the individual’s actual mental, physical and adaptive limitations.” Id.
21. See Peter Horstman, Protective Services for the Elderly: The Limits of
Parens Patriae, 40. MO. L. REV. 215, 218 (1975) (discussing how an incompetent
person’s protection of property was recognized during the ancient time of
Cicero).
22. Id. (stating “in the 14th century, guardianship was formally recognized
in England as a duty of the sovereign and exercised through the Lord
Chancellor.”). The theory of parens patriae stems from the 14th century English
belief that the king is the father of the country, therefore the king has a duty to
furnish protection for the mentally disabled, where upon a disabled person’s
death, assets in his or her name would transfer to his heirs. Id.
23. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.88.005 (2015)(stating broadly that a disabled
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make decisions on behalf of the disabled adult within Illinois stem
from common law, early case law, and the Illinois probate act. 24
Illinois’s probate law evolved over the last century to allow
disabled adults to execute estate plans when under guardianship.
Reflecting the parens patriae approach, Illinois courts initially
allowed a guardian, only upon their petition, to make expenses
solely for the disabled person’s need for immediate support.25 As
decades passed, courts recognized the need not only to maintain
support for the disabled person, but also to conserve and maintain
those funds spent from his or her estate for the disabled person’s
future enjoyment and use.26 The guardian’s ability to make
expenditures not directed toward the disabled person’s support soon
included the authority to make non-charitable gifts to lower the size
of the taxable estate.27
More recent cases, which implore a more liberal reading of the
Illinois probate code, have stated that guardians may act with
implied authority from the code to perform acts not specifically
mentioned.28 While the standards have loosened throughout
Illinois’s history, the court can enact its supervisory powers and
provide equitable treatment when needed, such as when a guardian
breaches his or her fiduciary duty by wasting the disabled person’s
estate.29 Ultimately, it was not until 1996 that the Illinois Probate
adult’s liberty is restricted to the extent that a guardian must provide for his or
her care); cf. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2401(2015)(discussing specifically the duties
and obligations of a guardian to manage an estate of the disabled adult); 5/11a18 (noting the authority of a guardian to execute the disabled adult disabled
adult’s estate and the duty to do so within the disabled adult’s ascertainable
wishes).
24. See infra Part III.A.
25. See In re Conservatorship of Hall, 19 Ill. App. 295, 298-99 (Ill. App. Ct.
1886) (allowing support for the disabled person’s daughter); Lewis v. Hill, 56
N.E.2d 619, 621 (Ill. 1944) (discussing the need to consider the disabled person’s
interest in allowing the guardian to sell her home in order to use the proceeds
to support the disabled person).
26. Proehl v. Leadley, 230 N.E.2d 516, 519 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967).
27. See In re Estate of Berger, 520 N.E.2d 690, 705 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (citing
Annotation, Power of court or guardian to make noncharitable gifts or
allowances out of the funds of incompetent ward, 224 A.L.R.3d 863 (1969)).
28. See Karbin v. Karbin, 977 N.E.2d 154, 160 (Ill. 2012) (finding that
reading both 5/11a-17 and 5/11a-18 together confers broad decision making
authority to the guardian of the estate and person); see also In re Burgress, 725
N.E.2d 1266, 1270-71 (Ill. 2000) (holding that a guardian has implied authority
under 5/11a-17 to continue a dissolution of marriage action for the ward as it
keeps with the disabled person’s wishes); In re Estate of K.E.J., 887 N.E.2d 704,
721 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (holding that under 5/11a-17 a guardian may petition
for the disabled adult to undergo an involuntary sterilization if there is clear
and convincing evidence it is within that disabled person’s best interests).
29. See In re Estate of O’Hare, 34 N.E.2d 1126, 1131-32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)
(finding that the guardian’s disregard in managing and controlling the disabled
person’s estate resulted in affirming a proper remedy under 5/11a-18). Not only
did the guardian maintain sloppy record keeping of estate expenditures, the
guardian also used large sums of the estate for the benefit of the whole family
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Act incorporated past case law in amending §11a-18(a-5) so that
guardians have statutory authority to create an estate plan on
behalf of a disabled adult. 30 Since then, courts have given the
statute a broad reading which therefore allows, a guardian to act in
ways not limited to the stated language within §11a-18(a-5).31
In order for an Illinois court to appoint a plenary guardian, a
court must find that one that is unable to manage his or her estate
due to some physical incapability or mental disability.32 The court
will consider and grant a guardian’s petition for guardianship if he
or she is “capable of providing an active and suitable program of
guardianship for the person with a disability.” 33 In considering
appointment and limitations of a guardian, the court is concerned
with promoting the disabled adult’s well-being and protecting the
disabled adult from abuse, exploitation, or neglect. 34 A court may
consider appointment of either a family or professional guardian. 35
Once a court has appointed a qualified guardian based on the
petition for guardianship,36 the guardian shall have a duty to
manage disabled adult’s person, estate, or both. 37 Section 5/11a-18
of the Illinois probate act expressly allows a probate court to
authorize “the guardian to exercise any or all powers over the
estate” that the disabled adult “could exercise if present and not
under disability.”38 The court, for example, may approve the
rather than solely for the disabled person; expenditures included the purchase
of a home, vehicles, and other effects for the family. Id. at 1129.
30. MARGOT GORDON, ESTATE PLANNING IN ILLINOIS GUARDIANSHIPS 2015
EDITION ch. 1 (2015).
31. See Zagorski v. Kaleta, 404 Ill. App. 3d 75, 86-87 (2010) (stating that a
guardian may amend a disabled adult’s revocable trust, not only for limiting tax
consequences, but for any reason whatsoever as long as it keeps with the disable
adult’s wishes).
32. See 755 ILCS 5/11a-2 (2015)(defining further a “person with a disability”
as one who exposes their family to distress from drug use and waste of the estate
or one with fetal alcohol syndrome); D. REBECCA MITCHELL, SPECIAL-NEEDS
TRUSTS § 3.60 (2015).
33. See 755 ILCS 11a-5 (2015) (requiring that the guardian be at least 18
years old, an American citizen, free of unsound mind and disability, and
possessing no felony conviction unless the best interests of the disabled adult
outweigh the conviction and the conviction does not involve harm to an elder or
minor).
34. 755 ILCS 5/11a-3(b) (2016).
35. For a discussion on how family and professional guardians tend to make
decisions based on a disabled adult’s preferences or best interests, see infra Part
III.A.2.
36. See Howse v. Johnson, 708 N.E.2d 466, 472 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (stating
that, in selecting a guardian, the court shall “give due consideration to the
preference of the disabled person,” but “of paramount concern . . . is the best
interest and well-being of the disabled person, regardless of that person’s
choice.”).
37. 755 ILCS 5/11a-17 (2015); 755 ILCS 5/11a-18 (2015).
38. 755 ILCS 5/11a-18(a-5)(2015); see also Zagorski v. Kaleta, 404 Ill. App.
3d 75, 86-87 (2010)(ruling that a plenary guardian may amend a revocable trust
where the court found that the current trust does not align with the disabled
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appointed guardian estate as sole beneficiary of the disabled adult’s
estate,39 as long as the decision is “keeping with the disabled adult’s
wishes so far as they can be ascertained.” 40
2. The Hierarchical Substituted Judgment and Best
Judgment Hybrid Standard
Illinois’s hierarchical substituted judgment and best judgment
hybrid standard requires that a disabled adult’s purported wish on
a matter be followed where that wish is what the disabled adult
would have decided if he or she were competent; if the disabled
adult’s wish is unascertainable, then the least restrictive best
interests of the disabled adult shall be implemented.41 The test is
based on the common law rationale that, in a world preserved by a
guardian’s substituted judgments where the disabled adult regains
mental cognizance, the judgment would conform to the disabled
adult’s intentions so he or she would therefore be pleased with the
substituted decision.42 This rule shows that a guardian’s powers,
whether from statutory or implied authority, must consider the
wishes of the disabled person before acting. 43 This is juxtaposed to
states that have explicitly limited the actions a guardian may
perform even if that action is be one of the disabled adult’s wishes. 44
adult’s wishes).
39. As the case background in infra Part II.C shows, this testamentary plan
is the one that Donald’s mother seeks to implement. The court, in statutorily
interpreting 755 ILCS 5/11a-18(a) and 5/11a-18(a-5) contemporaneously,
allowed the conclusion that “the guardian is in the position to initially assess
who should be a beneficiary of the proposed estate plan.” Estate of Howell v.
Howell, 36 N.E.3d 293, 302 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
40. 755 ILCS 5/11a-18(a-5)(2015).
41. 755 ILCS 5/11a-17(e)(2015); see also Estate of Greenspan, 137 Ill. 2d 1,
17-18 (1990) (determining that removal of artificial life support is in best
intentions of the disabled adult where family member testimony reveals his
dislike for life-support systems and nursing homes); In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200,
220-23 (1994) (deciding that administration of psychotrophic medication or
electroconvulsive therapy of the mentally ill is governed by the substituted
judgment rule).
42. See Alexander Boni-Saenz, Personal Delegations, 78 BROOKLYN L. REV.
1231, 1255 n. 108 (2013) (noting that the common law origin derives from
dealing with lunatics and idiots, the former class being those with mental
capabilities but lost it and the latter class being those that never had mental
capabilities).
43. See Zagorski, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 85-86 (applying rules of statutory
interpretation to conclude that a guardian’s amendment of trusts is not limited
only to tax purposes); see also 11a-18(a-5) (stating that “in ascertaining and
carrying out the disabled adult’s wishes the court may consider, but is not
limited to, minimization of state or Federal income,” and “[t]he disabled adult’s
wishes as best they can be ascertained shall be carried out, whether or not tax
savings are involved.”).
44. See Boni-Saenz, supra note 42, at 1244 (noting the potential authority of
a guardian to manipulate a disabled adult’s assets, therefore making a will for
a disabled adult is barred). The rationale for this rule is that allowing guardians

2017]

Guardianship, Heir Misbehavior, and the Modern Family

623

Historically, the hierarchical standard has been applied within
Illinois mainly to address medically incapacitated individuals who
are unable to declare their own intentions. 45 Illinois case law has
applied the standard where the guardian must make decisions
regarding the disabled adult’s use of life-sustaining treatment or
medicine while in an institution.46 In these medical related
instances, there is case law to help guide guardians to act properly
when an individual loses capacity. 47 What is unique to Estate of
Howell is the application of the hierarchical standard in an estate
planning scenario where the preferences of the disabled adult were
not ascertainable.48
There is an ongoing discussion on how to ascertain disabled
adults’ wishes and interests. One Illinois court ruled where one’s
desires had been expressed that any prior considerations occurring
before the lawsuit can trump other considerations given during the
proceedings.49 This raises the question as to how courts go about
obtaining such information for what the best interests of a disabled
adult may be and whether those interests should conflict with prior
preferences. Further application of the hierarchical standard will be
expounded upon after a discussion of the rights and status of a
disabled adult.50

to prepare wills as well as make financial making judgments to be delegated to
the guardians may allow in manipulation of the estate. Id.
45. See 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1 (2016)(requiring, upon petition to authorize a
electroconvulsive therapy or psychotropic medication, the guardian show
numerous standards are met including clear and convincing proof that benefits
of the therapy or medication outweigh potential harms to the disabled person);
see also Rebecca O’Neill, Surrogate Health Care Decisions for Adults in Illinois
– Answers to the Legal Questions That Health Providers Face on a Daily Basis,
29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 411, 431-32 (1998)(providing precedent that an appointed
guardian, on behalf of an incapacitated disabled adult, can authorize the use of
psychotropic drugs, blood transfusions, and abortions).
46. See In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 217 (arguing successfully that a guardian’s
judgment should override the interest the state has in determining medication
for one presiding at a mental institution); Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33,
50-51 (1989) (establishing that the guardian’s mother, the disabled adult
receiving life-sustaining treatments, could apply her best judgment absent the
disabled adult’s intent).
47. See Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 49-51 (stating a surrogate decision
maker determine prior expressed explicit intent regarding medical treatment).
48. See 755 ILCS 5/11a-17(e) (2015)(stating that decisions are to be made “in
accordance with the preferences of the disabled adult.”) (emphasis added).
49. See In re Estate of K.E.J., 887 N.E.2d 704, 721 (Ill. App. Ct.
2008)(considering that the disabled adult’s head injury at the age of 8 that
caused her disability would preclude any preferences she may have as a 29 year
old in receiving a tubal ligation).
50. See infra Part III.A.
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3. Legal Status of a Disabled Adult
The Illinois statute defines a disabled adult as one who is
eighteen or older and unable to manage one’s own estate or person
due to physical incapacity or mental deterioration. 51 Upon filing for
guardianship, the respondent’s adjudication of legal disability is a
question of fact,52 where the trial court must consider and answer
the threshold question of whether the respondent is “capable of
managing his person or estate.”53 The petition for adjudication to
declare a disability must also include a physician’s opinion on the
mental or physical condition of the respondent and a
recommendation for guardianship.54
However, a person may be mentally or physically disabled—as
opposed to a person has been adjudicated legally disabled—and so
may possess the testamentary capacity needed to demonstrate
sound mind and memory.55 Along with being 18 or older and with
the presence and attestation of two witnesses, a potentially disabled
adult with sound mind and memory may execute a will. 56 When
evaluating the validity of a will, evidence including a doctor’s report
or lay witnesses’ testimony may be used to build or rebuke a claim

51. See 755 ILCS 5/11a-2 (2015) (noting that a disabled person may include
one with a mental illness, developmental disability, or one who suffers from
effects relating to drinking, drugging, or gambling).
52. See 755 ILCS 5/11a-3(a) (2015) (stating “the court may adjudge a person
to be a disabled person, but only if it has been demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence that the person is a disabled); accord. 5/11a-2 (defining the
characteristics of a person with a disability); see also Estate of Galvin v. Galvin,
112 Ill. App. 3d. 677, 681-812 (1983) (stating that determination of
incompetency is “a uniquely factual question to be decided by the trial judge.”).
53. In re Estate of McPeak, 53 Ill. App. 3d 133, 135 (1977).
54. See 755 ILCS 5/11a-9 (2015) (outlining the necessary contents of a
physician’s report that accompanies a petition to appoint a guardian and
adjudicate a disability). The physician’s report should include: an explanation
of the respondent’s disability and how it affects his or her functionality and
decision-making abilities, an evaluation on the respondent’s physical and
mental state, an opinion whether guardianship is needed, a recommendation on
how the respondent should be treated and rehabbed, and certification of any
physician’s credentials that contributed to the report. 755 ILCS 5/11a-9(a)
(2015).
55. 6 ILL. JURISPRUDENCE PROBATE, ESTATES AND TRUSTS § 4:03 (Matthew
Bender & Co. 2015). Under the Illinois Probate Act, one possesses testamentary
capacity if he or she: “comprehends and remembers the natural objects of his or
her bounty; knows and remembers the extent and character of his or her
property; knows the manner in which he or she wishes to dispose of the
property; and makes a disposition in accordance with that plan.” Id.
56. See 755 ILCS 5/4-1 (2015) (stating “[e]very person who has attained the
age of [eighteen] years and is of sound mind and memory has power to bequeath
by will the real and personal estate which he has at the time of his death.”); 755
ILCS 5/4-3 (2015) (requiring a will to be in writing, to be signed by the hand or
under direction of the testator, and to be attested to by two witnesses in
presence of the testator).
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of unsound mind and memory,57 but the most persuasive evidence
is gained from the disabled adult’s preferences. 58 The problem in
ascertaining one’s testamentary intent may be exacerbated if one’s
mental capacity is questionable during the process of drafting a will,
although the law only requires sound mind and memory at the
moment of will execution.59 In disposing property through a will, the
testamentary standard requires one with a disability to have
mental capacity at the time of execution to understand his or her
natural bounty and the extent of his or her property, but it is not
necessary for the disabled to actually recall detailed information. 60
A disabled adult may be encouraged to have a guardian
appointed on his or her behalf to create and ultimately effectuate a
will or estate plan.61 The court has authority to grant the guardian
powers over the disabled adult’s estate in light of “the permanence
of the disabled adult’s disabling condition and the natural objects of
the disabled adult’s bounty.”62 Yet it remains the same that the
“disabled adult’s wishes as best they can be ascertained shall be
carried out.”63 The hierarchical standard allows a guardian’s choice
to fill the gap where testamentary capacity is non-existent,
therefore a guardian can legally act for the disabled adult to add a

57. See Estate of Austwick, 275 Ill. App. 3d 665, 669 (1995) (suggesting that
a doctor need not decide the decisional capacity of the patient); see also Estate
of Basich, 79 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1001 (1979) (stating that such evidence is
“competent and may be considered if it tends to show the testator’s mental
condition at the time he made the will.”).
58. See Zagorski v. Kaleta, 404 Ill. App. 3d 75, 97 (2010) (providing that,
even though there is a guardian, the disabled adult’s preferences should be
given substantial weight where the disabled adult possess decision-making
capacity).
59. See 755 ILCS 5/4-1 (2015) (providing, “[e]very person who has attained
the age of 18 years and is of sound mind and memory has power to bequeath by
will the real and personal estate which he has at the time of his death.”)
(emphasis added); see also Anlicker v. Brethorst, 329 Ill. 11, 17 (1928)
(explaining that “the time of the execution of the will is the time to judge the
testator’s mental capacity.”).
60. See Challiner v. Smith, 396 Ill. 106, 124 (1947) (dying and deaf testatrix
with broken leg and breast cancer with whose inability to recall the extent of
her property is not controlling in determination the validity of the testatrix’s
will); see also Estate of Osborn, 234 Ill. App. 3d 651, 658 (1991) (ruling summary
judgment on the issue of testamentary capacity where evidence suggested
testatrix’s weakened state but not her mental incapacity).
61. See 755 ILCS 5/11a-18(c) (2015) (stating “the guardian of the estate shall
have the care, management and investment of the estate . . . ”), see also Margot
Gordon, Determination of Disabled Adult’s Testamentary Capacity, § 4.1 in
ESTATE PLANNING IN ILLINOIS GUARDIANSHIPS (2015) (discussing need for
guardian to hire legal counsel where tax and special-needs issues are apparent).
62. 5/11a-18(a-5).
63. Id.
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codicil to a will,64 amendment a trust,65 and add features that may
deviate from an intestate distribution of his property. 66

B. Rules of Intestacy and Consequences
of a Neglectful Heir
The antiquated yet effectively enforceable common law
doctrine of intestacy has grown from its stringent medieval roots
and now allows disinheritance of an heir in Illinois based on their
numerous harmful actions to the decedent.67 The rules of intestacy
stem from the prevailing idea that, due to a family’s blood
relationship, an intestate decedent’s heirs are entitled to receive
personal and real property absent a written will or where a written
will is present but improperly executed.68 Today’s modern statutory
law has changed significantly since the common law’s archaic
demands of primogeniture and limited testamentary freedom; 69
modern law instead discards such relics and allows individuals to
custom tailor their asset transfers in a way they see fit by utilizing
a will.70 Such a transformation has occurred because American
citizens desire their accumulation of wealth to stay with who they
choose: either within the family or to others that the testator
chooses.71 However, one idea not generally adopted by today’s law
across the United States is the effect of heir misbehavior on an
intestate interest.72 The only instance that is uniform among the
states is generally cited in a slayer statute, which bars an heir from
64. A codicil is an amendment to the will and is made effective by proper
signing and attestation of the will. See 755 ILCS 5/4-3 (2015).
65. 5/11a-18(a-5)(11)(summarizing the guardian’s authority to allow
“modif[ication] by means of codicil or trust amendment the terms of the disabled
adult’s will or any revocable trust created by the disabled adult.”).
66. See Estate of Howell v. Howell, 36 N.E.3d 293, 297-98 (Ill. App. Ct.
2015)(applying rules of statutory construction allowed the Illinois Appellate
Court to reverse the trial court’s holding that the estate plan must conform to
Illinois rules of intestacy).
67. For purposes of this Comment, a neglectful heir is one who is punishable
via disinheritance under the rules of intestacy.
68. See Paula Monopoli, “Deadbeat Dads”: Should Support and Inheritance
Be Linked?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 257, 259 (1994) (noting that the relationship of
the family unit does not change a blood relative’s right to inheritance).
69. See Joshua Tate, Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 129, 149, 151 (2008) (defining primogeniture as “the right of
the firstborn son to succeed to his father’s land”, and describing the use of
enfeoff as where a landowner would allow friends to use his real property and
that it would be transferred to his friends upon the owner’s death).
70. Id. at 154-57 (discussing how British and Spanish colonies, which
eventually became a part of the America, abolished use of primogeniture; most
states had abolished it by 1800).
71. See id. at 156-60 (providing American’s encouragement for work and
savings in order to maximize wealth as well as the view that one may do with
their assets as they see satisfactory).
72. See infra Part II.B.2., Part III.B.
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gaining his or her share of the decedent’s inheritance if that heir
kills or otherwise advances the death of the decedent.73
The Illinois rules of intestacy are governed solely under the
Illinois Probate Act.74 The Probate Act expressly notes that there is
no distinction between brothers and sisters of full-blood or halfblood relations;75 this notion acts as a reminder of the strong
emphasis that the common law places on blood relations even to this
day.76 Where a will fails to properly devise all property or there is
no will at all, the distribution of a decedent’s assets are determined
by the applicable rule of intestacy. 77 The rules of intestacy will not
always be followed if an heir has acted in certain ways that society
frowns upon during the decedent’s lifetime. For example, statutes
in Illinois bar inheritance to heir, if they abandoned a minor,78 if the
child was born out of wedlock,79 if the child was neglected,80 and if
the heir commits neglect, abuse, or financial exploitation against
the disabled adult or the estate. 81
To expound on the abandonment statute, for example, its policy
reflects society’s view that a parent has an obligation to care for
their children, but unfortunately this obligation has begun to be
neglected within the parlance of our times. 82 The truth is, “[i]n the
vast majority of jurisdictions the intestate rules treat an
abandoning parent as an equal heir with the non-abandoning
parent. Equity requires a different result.” 83 While there is a
statutory distinction between neglect of a disabled adult and
73. See Monopoli, supra note 68, at 273 (1994) (noting the one major example
of law, referred to as slayer statutes, acts to disinherit an heir who murders the
decedent). Every state, excluding three, have statutory language regarding
disinheritance through slaying the decedent, while those remaining three have
case law which ban the inheritance. Anne Marie Rhodes, The Thirtieth Annual
Law Review Symposium of Estate Planning: Changing Laws for Changing
Times: Symposium Article: Consequences of Heirs’ Misconduct: Moving from
Rules to Discretion, 33 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 975, 979 n. 20-21 (2007).
74. 755 ILCS 5/2-1 (1999).
75. Id.
76. Id.; see also Meyers v. Fraser, No. 43,083, 1944 LEXIS 985, *5-*6 (Ill.
App. Ct. Oct. 23, 1944) (interpreting the controlling statute, which disallows
distinguishing based on a blood relation, to indicate a separate group of
descendants). A majority of states treat full-blood and half-blood siblings the
same in regards to intestate distributions. E.g. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-1 (2015);
IND. CODE § 29-1-2-1, § 29-1-2-5 (2015).
77. See 755 ILCS 5/4-14 (2015)(stating, “[t]he real and personal estate of a
testator that is not bequeathed by his will descends and shall be distributed as
intestate estate.”).
78. 755 ILCS 5/2-4 (2015).
79. 755 ILCS 5/2-2 (2015).
80. 755 ILCS 5/2-6.5 (2015).
81. 755 ILCS 5/2-6.2 (2015).
82. See Monopoli, supra note 68, at 259 n. 2 (according to an organization,
parents are more likely to pay off their car loan delinquencies than support owed
to mothers (citing Press Release, Children’s Defense Fund (June 17, 1994))).
83. Anne-Marie Rhodes, Abandoning Parents Under Intestacy: Where Are
We, Where We Need to Go, 27 IND. L. REV. 517, 518 (2008).

628

The John Marshall Law Review

[50:615

abandonment of a disabled minor,84 the underlying principle is the
same: today’s legal system places a higher pedigree on a
relationship based on blood rather than what should be deemed
equitable within the modern family unit. 85
The Illinois standards differ regarding the neglect of a minor
and the neglect of a disabled adult. 86 The statute dealing with
neglect of a disabled person does not make mention of acts done to
the person during his or her childhood, but instead states that the
court shall consider facts and circumstances as it seems appropriate
to reduce the benefit received.87 This leaves the question open of
whether the benefit may be reduced entirely based on the facts and
circumstances.

C. The Estate of Howell v. Howell
The case of Estate of Howell centers on Donald, a cognitively
disabled male.88 Donald was born out of wedlock to LaTanya and
Donald Bernard Howell (hereinafter Donald Bernard).89 As an
infant and while in utero, Donald succumbed to lead poisoning that
resulted in severe cognitive disabilities. 90 The condition was

84. See 755 ILCS 5/11-13 (2015) (listing duties of a guardian to a minor); see
also e.g., 755 ILCS 5/11a-17, 5/11a-18 (2015) (listing duties of a personal and
estate guardian).
85. See Rhodes, supra note 83, at 547 (declaring, “[t]he root of the legal
problem is intestacy’s historic link to feudal life and to property rights based on
inflexible bloodlines.”).
86. Compare 755 ILCS 5/2-6.2 (2015)(discussing consequences of abuse,
neglect, or financial exploitation to one who is an elder or disabled) with 755
ILCS 5/2-6.5 (2015) (discussing consequences of a parent neglecting a child
while making no distinction between a disabled child and a non-disabled child).
87. See 755 ILCS 5/2-6.2 (2015)(stating, “[t]he court may, in its discretion,
consider, such facts and circumstances as it deems appropriate to allow the
person found civilly liable for financial exploitation to receive a reduction in
interest or benefit” instead of no interest or benefit).
88. Donald was born on November 15, 1991, with microcephaly caused by
lead poisoning. Estate of Howell v. Howell, 36 N.E.3d 293, 295 (Ill. App. Ct.
2015). Children’s early exposure to lead poisoning commonly occurred from
eating or breathing in lead-based paint and may result in “severe cerebral
edema and permanent cerebral damage.” COURTROOM MEDICINE SERIES: HEAD
AND BRAIN § 141.05(2)(a)(ii) (2015). Microcephaly is a type of cerebral damage
identifiable by an “abnormally small head” that “correlates strongly with
mental retardation and cannot be treated.” Nancy K. Rhoden, Treatment
Dilemmas For Imperiled Newborns: Why Quality of Life Counts, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1238, 1291 (1985).
89. Estate of Howell, 36 N.E.3d at 294-95, 304.
90. Howell v. Chi. Hous. Auth., No. 1-09-3617, 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 204, at
*1-*2 (Ill. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2011). The testifying doctor proclaimed that due to
Donald being exposed to lead paint in the womb and as a young infant, his
condition shortly thereafter was “characterized by significant language and
intellectual and social retardation to a point where he is never going to be
employable and will require long-term 24-hour custodial care.” Id at *7-*8.
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ultimately identified as microcephaly.91 The jury verdict granted
$16.5 million in 2011 for Donald’s personal injury lawsuit. 92
Unfortunately, Donald’s condition is permanent and requires daily
medication, numerous types of therapy, a child proof living
environment, and extra assistance from his mother, LaTanya
Turks, and caregiver, Tyheshia Wilkins.93 Upon receiving the
judgment, coguardians LaTanya and Northern Trust Bank
petitioned the court to create two instruments, a revocable trust and
pour-over will,94 for Donald in 2012.95 Under this plan, Donald
would be the sole beneficiary during his life, and only upon his death
would LaTanya become beneficiary of the corpus with Tyhesia as
the successor in interest.96 In petitioning the court for permission to
commence this estate plan, LaTanya argues that she is able to
utilize Donald’s best interests to create the estate plan in place of
Donald’s preferred judgment, because he cannot clearly show how
he would like the estate to be crafted. 97
The opposing guardian ad litem argued that the proposed
estate plan would be void and that since Donald himself cannot
declare any subjective intent regarding distribution of his estate,
the court must order the coguardians to create an estate plan
following the rules of intestacy. 98 If the guardian ad litem’s
recommendation were implemented, then LaTanya, Donald
Bernard, and Donald’s ten half-brothers and half-sisters, all of
which are Donald Bernard’s children with multiple women, would
receive am equal pro rata share of the assets pursuant to Illinois’s
intestacy statute.99 LaTanya appealed the case to reverse the trial
91. Estate of Howell, 36 N.E.3d at 295.
92. Chi. Hous. Auth., 2011 LEXIS 204, at *1, *20.
93. See 755 ILCS 5/4a-5(1)(2015)(noting that a caregiver cannot be a family
member of the individual gaining assistance, but is one who assists in taking
care of one on a voluntary or compensatory basis); see Estate of Howell, 36
N.E.3d at 295-96. There is conflicting testimony regarding Tyheshia’s blood
relationship to the family. Id. at 296.
94. Revocable trusts, while they do not have tax advantages, maintain many
advantages of a trust and allow the settlor to keep control over the trust during
the settlor’s life because he or she reserves the power to amend and revoke the
instrument. ILL. TRUST. ADMIN. § 1.3. (2015). The existence of a pour-over will,
which is commonly coupled with a revocable trust, allows the trust “to receive
all of the assets of a probate estate.” Id. at § 7.95; § 11.8.
95. Estate of Howell, 36 N.E.3d at 295.
96. Id. In order to realize this distributive plan the coguardians intended to
utilize a revocable trust and pour-over will. Id. The plan also allows Donald’s
aunt Laurie to take if LaTanya and Tyhesia predeceased Donald. Id.
97. Id. at 301. When the guardian ad litem interviewed Donald, he did not
answer questions about his care and instead spoke nonsense words. This led to
the guardian at litem’s conclusion that he was unable to direct preparation of
an estate plan. Id. at 295.
98. Estate of Howell, 36 N.E.3d at 296-97.
99. Donald has little to no relationship with his dad and none with his ten
half siblings. Id. However, Illinois intestacy law does not make a distinction
“between the kindred of the whole and the half blood,” therefore both parents
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court’s order that the trust and will must follow the rules of
intestacy on the basis that an estate plan can still be made based
off the best interests of Donald. 100
The Illinois Appellate Court scrutinized the Illinois Probate
Act and reversed the trial court, holding that estate plans shall
incorporate the disabled adult’s objective best interests because the
disabled adult’s personal judgment cannot be ascertained. 101 The
implication from this ruling in this matter allowed LaTanya to
become the estate’s beneficiary because the estate plan and
beneficiary designation represents Donald’s best interests. 102 This
ruling ensures that a disabled adult’s estate plan is not forced to
follow the rules of intestacy.103

III. THE ILLINOIS PROBATE ACT AND OTHER
JURISDICTIONS’ PROBATE ACTS: WHY ILLINOIS HAS SET
THE STANDARD FOR OTHERS TO FOLLOW
When it comes to Illinois’ hierarchical standard and the litany
of laws that disinherit misbehaving heirs, no other jurisdiction
grants more protection for disabled adults under guardianship who
wish to create an equitable estate plan. Not only do these laws
appeal to today’s modern family, 104 but the laws also have done
away with a focus on blood-relations and forced distribution to those
that may not be so deserving. Part A of this analysis discusses the
different guardian decision-making standard across the United
States, along with how the decision-making tendencies of appointed
guardians comport with the jurisdiction’s decision-making
standard.105 Because of the difference in standards among
jurisdictions, the outcome in Estate of Howell would likely not be as
equitable in jurisdictions whose decision-making standards differ
from Illinois’s standard.106 Part B of the analysis compares different
jurisdiction’s probate laws to show that, unlike those other

and siblings shall receive an equal parts share in the estate. 755 ILCS 5/2-1
(2015).
100. Estate of Howell, 36 N.E.3d at 297.
101. Id. at 300.
102. Id. at 299-300. The court interpreted 5/11a-18 to allow the “disabled
adult’s wishes as best they can be ascertained shall be carried” but the language
does not state that only the disabled adult’s wishes should be carried out. Id.
103. Id. at 296.
104. The term “modern family” as used throughout this Comment is a family
that exists under Illinois’s probate laws, where the law’s policy concerns for
providing fair and equitable treatment for a deserving family trumps the notion
of receiving inheritance for sake of having a blood ties with a decedent who may
have been mistreated by the heir during life.
105. See infra Part III.A.
106. See infra Part III.A.1.
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jurisdictions, Illinois actually permits punishment of misbehaving
heirs using statutes that bars inheritance. 107

A. Guardianship Decision-Making Standards:
Substituted Judgment, Best Interest, Hybrid, and
No Standard at All
Since the court allows appointed guardians to use discretion in
supporting a disabled adult and managing their estate,108 a
multitude of factors induced by legislature influence the process the
guardian takes in reaching major decision.109 Further, studies show
that a jurisdiction’s statutory language and the guardian’s
relationship to the disabled adult can often influence whether the
guardian favors a best interests standard or substituted judgment
standard.110 Following is an analysis of numerous factors that affect
how guardians make their decisions, including the different
decision-making models jurisdictions use and how the guardian’s
relationship with the disabled adult changes the decision-making
dynamic.
1. Impact of Different Decision-Making Models
Eighteen United States jurisdictions have statutes relating to
substituted judgment language, six employ a best interests
approach, and twenty-eight have neither substituted judgment nor
best interest decision-making guidelines for guardians.111 A
majority of the jurisdictions with substituted judgment language
107. See infra Part III.B.
108. But see Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 52 (1989) (discussing the
state’s common law parens patriae power, which allows courts to intervene on a
guardian’s decision to administer end-of-life treatment to a disabled adult).
109. See Ralph Brashier, Conservatorships, Capacity, and Crystal Balls, 87
TEMP. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2014) (discussing how current guardianship reform seeks
to limit excess state intervention by enhancing the decision-making discretion
a guardian is afforded).
110. General findings of the study, which involved participation of sixty
guardians, indicated that the best interest approach allowed more consideration
to what the family members would want. However, when deciding an issue
regarding finances or property, a guardian was more inclined to use a
substituted judgment approach paired with evidence of current conversations
with the disabled adult. The jurisdiction’s statutory language does influence the
standard employed. A family guardian is more likely to consider the views of
other family members and rely on past conversations, while a professional
guardian uses a more pragmatic approach and use of current disabled adult
conversations. For further discussion, see Linda Whitton and Lawrence Frolik,
Symposium: Third National Guardianship Summit: Standards of Excellence:
Surrogate Decision-Making Standards for Guardians: Theory and Reality, 2012
UTAH L. REV. 1491, 1519-21 (2012).
111. Id. at 1495. These jurisdictions include all 50 states, the District of
Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
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also incorporate a best interest’s approach. 112 Only two
jurisdictions, Illinois and the District of Columbia, utilize a
hierarchical decision-making approach, where the best interests of
the disabled adult guide a guardian’s decision-making process only
if the guardian is unable to apply the substituted judgment
standard.113
a. No Decision-Making Guidelines Approach
Twenty-eight jurisdictions do not use a substituted judgment
or best interests standard to define guardian duties when making a
decision.114 Instead, some jurisdictions leave discretion to the
guardian to make decisions as if they were the disabled person’s
parent,115 others use an ordinary care and diligence standard, 116
and some use non-specific wording to define a guardian’s powers.117
A majority of these jurisdictions incorporate language from the 1969
Uniform Probate Code that give “[a] guardian of an incapacitated
person… the same powers, rights and duties respecting his disabled
adult that a parent has respecting his emancipated minor child.”118
This standard would have created a troubling and
unpredictable result in Estate of Howell had LaTanya and Donald
Bernard been coguardians, because each guardian would need to act
on the best interests of Donald’s parents. Acting solely on behalf of
LaTanya would allow the court to reach the same holding as the
appellate court,119 but Donald Bernard would likely request that he

112. Id.
113. Id. at 1501 (utilizing such an approach gives “preference for substituted
judgment when possible”, otherwise the guardian acts on behalf of the disabled
adult’s best interest).
114. Id. at 1945; but see Michael Casasanto, A Model Code of Ethics for
Guardians, 11 WHITTIER L. REV. 543, 547 (1989) (arguing that a standard that
delineates a guardian’s duties to that of a parent reflects a best interests
approach).
115. See ALA. CODE § 26-2A-78 (2016) (stating that “[a] guardian of a minor
disabled adult has the powers and responsibilities of a parent regarding the
disabled adult’s health, support, education, or maintenance.”).
116. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 2401 (2016) (stating a guardian “has the
management and control of the estate and, in managing and controlling the
estate, shall use ordinary care and diligence.”).
117. See OKLA. STAT. TIT. 30 § 1-121 (2015) (defining a guardian’s duties,
inter alia, to “keep safely the property of his disabled adult.”).
118. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-312 (1969) (summarizing the duties and powers
of a guardian to require responsibility over the disabled adult’s estate and
person).
119. LaTanya’s court petition to create an estate plan for Donald that
deviates from the rules of intestacy was upheld and an evidentiary hearing was
held to decide if it is within Donald’s best interests for LaTanya to be the sole
beneficiary of his estate. Estate of Howell v. Howell, 36 N.E.3d 293, 295 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2015). It likely is presumed that a guardian acting as LaTanya would
come to the same testamentary plan.

2017]

Guardianship, Heir Misbehavior, and the Modern Family

633

receives the whole estate.120 Even where the standard gives criteria
to consider,121 it does not accommodate the situation where the two
parents have substantially conflicting interests and viewpoints
regarding the disabled adult’s needs.
b. Substituted Judgment Approach
The eighteen jurisdictions that use the substituted judgment
approach use one of two methods: a majority of the jurisdictions use
the substituted judgment standard combined with a best interests
approach,122 while the minority utilizes only a substituted judgment
standard.123 The majority of jurisdictions that use both substituted
judgment and best interests standards use a dual mandate or plain
language approach,124 a hierarchical approach,125 or a no priority
approach.126 These statutes are problematic because they do not

120. While Donald Bernard argues that the testamentary plan be dispersed
via intestacy, see Estate of Howell, 36 N.E.3d at 279 (stating “because it was
impossible to determine Donald’s wishes, any distributive portion of the estate
should follow the intestacy statute.”). If one were arguing on behalf of his best
interests he would ask for the entire estate. Id.
121. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-2A-78 (stating a guardian become “personally
acquainted with the disabled adult,” but that a guardian may delegate certain
responsibilities to the disabled adult); UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-312 (qualifying the
powers of a guardian as approving medical treatment, reporting the disabled
adult’s condition, and compelling support for the disabled adult from third
parties).
122. See Whitton and Frolik, supra note 111, at 1495 n.23 (listing all
eighteen jurisdictions whose guardianship statutes involve language indicating
use of the substituted judgment standard).
123. See id. at 1495 n.24 (listing fourteen of the eighteen jurisdictions that
include substituted judgment language “in combination with a best interest
component.”).
124. The dual mandate standard, created in the 1997 Uniform Guardianship
and Protective Proceedings Act “requires a guardian to ‘consider the expressed
desires and personal values of the disabled adult’ and ‘at all times . . . act in the
disabled adult’s best interest.’” Five jurisdictions adopted language similar to
this standard. See Lawrence Frolik and Linda Whitton, Symposium: The
Uniform Probate Code: Remaking American Succession Law: The UPC
Substituted Judgment/Best Interest Standard for Guardian Decisions: A
Proposal for Reform, 245 U. MICH. J.L. 739, 744 (2011) (listing the four
jurisdictions and single territory that use the dual mandate approach).
125. Six jurisdictions use a hierarchy distinction in their guardian statutory
scheme. Four of the jurisdictions of substituted judgment but also “require a
guardian to ‘consider the expressed desires and personal values of the disabled
adult’ and to ‘otherwise act in the disabled adult’s best interest,’” which only
merely suggests the guardian considers the disabled adult’s best interests
alongside the guardian’s own judgment. Two of the jurisdictions, Illinois and
the District of Columbia, explicitly require the best interest standard to be used
only if the substituted judgment standard cannot be effectively employed. See
id. at 744-45 (listing the six jurisdictions that use a hierarchy scheme). For
further discussion of the Illinois and the District of Columbia hierarchical
approach, see infra Part III.A.1.d.
126. Three jurisdictions use both best interest and substituted judgment
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delegate preferential use to either best interests or substituted
judgment standards and therefore the two standards conflict where
a statutory prioritization scheme is not in place.127 In applying this
standard generally to Estate of Howell, LaTanya would be arguing
the implementation of the best interests standard while the
guardian ad litem would advocate for the substituted judgment
standard. Though the substituted judgment standard would likely
fail because Donald’s desires and preferences cannot be
ascertained,128 the standard invites the clash between two
competing standards due to statutory vagueness in applying both.
The minority of states that use only the substituted judgment
standard generally require that the guardian obtain information
from the disabled adult, including their views, preferences, and
values, before making decisions on their behalf. 129 In cases such as
Estate of Howell where the disabled adult’s desires cannot be
understood, the substituted judgment standard would fail and
perhaps cause significant harm to the disabled adult’s future health
and affairs.130

standards but “do not indicate what relative weight guardians are to give
substituted judgment and best interest when making decisions.” See Frolik and
Whitton, supra note 125, at 746-47 (listing the three jurisdictions that use both
standards with no priority of implementation).
127. Whitton and Frolik, supra note 104, at 111; but see Frolik and Whitton,
supra note 125, at 746-47 (stating also that the legislative intent behind
conflicting statutes implies that a guardian consider best interests if the
substituted judgment of the disabled adult cannot be discerned).
128. Estate of Howell v. Howell, 36 N.E.3d 293, 297 (Ill. App. Ct.
2015)(stating the portion of Donald’s estate to be distributed should be done so
under the rules of intestacy). A conflicting statute’s vagueness may not provide
for whether best interests trump a lack of substituted judgment or if the rules
of intestacy should be followed instead. See Whitton and Frolik, supra note 111,
at 1500-01 (stating that some jurisdictions do not require a guardian to act in
the best interests of the disabled adult “at all times.”).
129.Id. at 1502-03 (listing the four jurisdictions that use only a substituted
judgment standard); e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.5314 (2016) (requiring the
guardian to consult with the disabled adult “[w]henever meaningful
communication is possible,” but does not provide for an alternate approach is
the communication is not possible); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.20 (2016)
(stating that the guardian shall give the disabled adult “the greatest amount of
independence and self-determination” regarding personal decisions and
property management).
130. Such a situation would arise if the statute had a strict adherence to the
substituted judgment standard, where the guardian may only consider past
preferences of the disabled adult, but past preferences have never been
manifested. See Frolik and Whitton, supra note 125, at 753 (stating “the
guardian must have actual knowledge of what the incapacitated person would
have done in the present circumstances.”).
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Best Interests Approach

Six jurisdictions use a sole best interests approach with no
substituted judgment language intact. 131 Some states directly
require the best interests of the disabled adult to be obeyed,132 while
at least one other state uses substantially similar language. 133 This
approach requires the guardian to act as a reasonable person would,
even if that means considering outside professional advice.134
The two issues with this approach are that there is little
guidance on what a best interest actually is, 135 and one guardian’s
reasonable approach on determining best interests may be wholly
inconsistent from another guardian’s perspective.136 For example, a
professional guardian would consult other professionals to create a
best interests decision, while a family guardian may instead only
consider opinions of other family and friends. 137 The biggest concern
with this approach is that, even if a disabled adult’s wishes or
preferences are known, the guardian could completely disregard
those desires.138 In Estate of Howell, Donald’s best interests were
objectively obtained because his judgment could not be
ascertained.139 If Donald’s guardian were not his mother then
different best interests would likely be advanced, which places great
importance on the appointment of a proper guardian. 140
131. See Whitton and Frolik, supra note 111, at 1497 n. 35 (listing the six
jurisdictions that contain language pertaining to a guardian’s use of the best
interests standard while omitting substituted judgment standard language).
132. See e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 475.120(2) (2016) (requiring “[a] guardian . .
. of an incapacitated person shall act in the best interest of the disabled adult.”);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.14(A)(2) (2016) (requiring an estate guardian “[t]o
manage the estate for the best interest of the disabled adult.”).
133. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 159.079 (2015).
134. See Frolik and Whitton, supra note 125 at, 756-57 (preferring a
guardian considers options based on his beliefs and other’s opinions instead of
being concerned with what the disabled adult wants or would prefer).
135. See Whitton and Frolik, supra note 111, at 1498 (stating “[t]he lack of
statutory guidance on the meaning of ‘best interest’ may explain, in part, why
there is so little case law on the meaning of the standard.”).
136. A guardian is left to consider what shall be within a disabled adult’s
best interests. See id. at 1497 (arguing that “none of these statutes provides
guidance as to . . . what the guardian should consider when determining
whether a decision will serve the incapacitated person’s best interest.”).
137. See Frolik and Whitton, supra note 125, at 757 (adding that strict
adherence to the best interests approach is necessary only if the disabled adult
is fully incapacitated and the guardian is a professional). For more information
on how different guardians reach decisions, see infra Part III.A.2.
138. See Frolik and Whitton, supra note 125, at 756 (stating “[t]he guardian
is not concerned with what the incapacitated person would do.”).
139. Estate of Howell v. Howell, 36 N.E.3d 293, 301 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)
(concluding that “[a]lthough Donald’s cognitive deficits have thus far prevented
him from expressing his wishes for his estate, the estate guardian is generally
empowered to act in Donald’s best interests, which may mean deviating from
intestacy.”).
140. See Peter Guthrie, Annotation, Priority and Preference in Appointment
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d. Hierarchical Decision-Making Approach
The hierarchical standard, enacted only in Illinois and the
District of Columbia, explicitly requires the best interest standard
to be used only if the disabled adult’s substituted judgment cannot
be ascertained.141 One general criticism of this approach is that a
guardian may intentionally provide a weak yet convincing
argument of the inability to ascertain a disabled adult’s wishes in
order to proceed to the best interests standard, resulting in a
standard critics call a “best judgment standard”. 142 However,
because a supportive family member appointed as guardian would
more likely be aware of the problems that the disabled adult
encounters, a family guardian should be given preference over a
professional guardian to counteract the potential for a guardian’s
bad faith argument.143
The Illinois statute allows the guardian to consider a
substituted judgment decision based on “the disabled adult’s
personal, philosophical, religious and moral beliefs, and ethical
values.”144 However, if the disabled adult’s wishes are
unascertainable then the best interest approach should be used
after considering the risks and consequences that the disabled adult
would deem important.145 The statute permits LaTanya to argue
that the best interests of both her and Donald are aligned and
therefore she should be the beneficiary of his estate. 146 The
of Conservator or Guardian for an Incompetent, 65 A.L.R. FED. 991 (1978)
(appointing courts should exercise discretion in contemplating the disabled
adult’s best interests when selecting a guardian).
141. See e.g., 755 ILCS 5/11a-18 (2015) (stating, upon petition of the
guardian, that he may “exercise any or all powers over the estate and business
affairs of the disabled adult that the disabled adult could exercise if present and
not under disability” and that “[t]he court may approve the making on behalf of
the disabled adult of such agreements as the court determines to be for the
disabled adult’s best interests.”); D.C. CODE § 21-2047(a)(6) (2015) (requiring a
guardian to “[m]ake decisions on behalf of the disabled adult by conforming as
closely as possible to a standard of substituted judgment,” or if the disabled
adult’s wishes are unascertainable, then the guardian shall “make the decision
on the basis of the disabled adult’s best interests.”).
142. Id. at 1514; see also Daniel Sulmasy & Lois Snyder, Substituted
Interests and Best Judgments, 304 J. AM. MED. ASSN. 1946, 1946-47 (2010)
(indicating a best judgment approach occurs where one’s preferences are
unknown).
143. See infra Part III.A.2. This argument does not consider the situation
where neither family nor professional guardian can discern a disabled adult’s
best interests where the disabled adult has been disabled since birth and has
never impliedly or expressly indicated his or her desires.
144. 755 ILCS 5/11a-17(e) (2015); see also 755 ILCS 5/11a-18(a-5) (2015)
(stating, “[t]he probate court, upon petition of a guardian… may authorize the
guardian to exercise any or all powers over the estate and business affairs of
the disabled adult that the disabled adult could exercise if present and not
under disability.”).
145. 755 ILCS 5/11a-17(e) (2015).
146. Estate of Howell v. Howell, 36 N.E.3d 293, 299-300 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015);
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language used for considering substituted judgment requires the
guardian to conform to the disabled adult’s wishes, and LaTanya’s
estate plan for Donald was “consistent with Donald’s wishes so far
as they can be ascertained.”147 The Illinois’s standard does not
clearly discern whether consideration of the disabled adult’s
complete desires are fully required,148 but the statute does make
certain that the court should consider the views of family and
friends.149 Due to LaTanya and Tyheshia’s relationship with
Donald, it would seem equitable that LaTanya can designate herself
as beneficiary of the estate with Tyheshia as a successor
beneficiary.150
The District of Columbia’s guardian decision-making statute is
more concise, stating that a guardian shall make decisions for the
disabled adult “by conforming as closely as possible to a standard of
substituted judgment or, if the disabled adult’s wishes are unknown
and remain unknown after reasonable efforts to discern them, make
the decision on the basis of the disabled adult’s best interests….”151
This standard implicates the hierarchical approach and may even
exculpates the guardian from liability.152 Unlike the Illinois statute,
however, the District of Columbia statute vaguely indicates what
best interests should be considered as opposed to Illinois’s
exhaustive list.153 While every state has various tests for deciding
how to disperse property or maintain a disabled adult’s health, 154
see also 755 ILCS 5/11-18(a)-(a-5) (2015). It should be noted that LaTanya has
been appointed guardianship over her son’s person and his estate, while
Northern Trust Bank is appointed only as a guardian over his estate. Estate of
Howell, 36 N.E.3d at 295.
147. Id. at 296.
148. See 755 ILCS 5/11a-18(a-5) (2015)(stating that the “probate court, upon
petition of a guardian . . . may authorize the guardian to exercise any and all
powers . . . that the disabled adult could exercise if present and not under
disability”, and that the guardian may apply funds of the disabled adult if the
court approves the application of funds “as being in keeping with the disabled
adult’s wishes so far as they can be ascertained.”).
149. Id. at 5/11a-18(a-5)(1), (6), (8) (2015) (stating that in ascertaining the
disabled adult’s wishes the court can consider friends or relatives of the disabled
adult who would likely acquire part of the disabled adult’s estate).
150. 755 ILCS 5/11a-18(a-5)(6) (2015) (permitting application of funds to
“creat[e] for the benefit of the disabled adult or others, revocable or irrevocable
trusts of his or her property that may extend beyond his or her disability or
life.”) (emphasis added).
151. D.C. CODE § 21-2047(a)(6) (2015).
152. Compare D.C. CODE § 21-2017 (2015) (declaring that a guardian “is not
personally liable to third persons by reason of that responsibility for acts of the
disabled adult.”), with 755 ILCS 5/11a-18(e) (2015) (exculpating guardian
liability only when it arises from an agency relationship).
153. D.C. CODE § 21-2047(a)(1)-(3) (2015). In interpreting the statute in full,
the best interests and substituted judgment are likely tied to the guardian’s
understanding of the disabled adult’s “capabilities, limitations, needs,
opportunities, and physical and mental health,” as well as the guardian’s
knowledge of the disabled adult’s property and need for protection. Id.
154. Sulmasy & Snyder, supra note 143, at 1504.
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the guardian is more likely to make a decision based on his or her
familial or non-familial relationship with the disabled adult.
2. Family Guardians and Professional Guardians
When a guardian must make a decision on behalf of a disabled
adult but the true preferences and desires of a disabled adult are
unknown, there is a chance that the guardian will choose the wrong
decision.155 Because it is hard to decipher the idiosyncratic and
sometimes private preferences of an individual, 156 it is estimated
that only 65% of decisions made on behalf of a disabled adult
accurately depict what the disabled adult would likely desire.157 A
guardian’s decision-making process depends largely upon the
professional or familial relationship the guardian has with the
disabled adult upon appointment. 158
Data collected by the National Guardian Summit discloses the
weight of factors that influence family and professional guardians’
decisions in determining property and financial decisions on behalf
of a disabled adult.159 The data shows that a professional guardian
is more likely to use a substituted judgment approach by
considering what the guardian believes the disabled adult would
want, while a family guardian is most likely to consider the disabled
adult’s best interests.160 A family guardian is more concerned than
the professional guardian when making a decision that could result
in harmony among existing family members, while a professional
guardian is more likely to consider the opinions of investors or
accountants.161 The family guardian is more inclined to make a
decision based on the objective view of the whole family while a
professional guardian is likely to make a decision based on the
disabled adult’s subjective views.162 These statistics reveal that a
family guardian would want to keep investments within the family
155. Boni-Saenz, supra note 42, at 1259-60.
156. Id.
157. See Nina A. Kohn and Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Designating Health Care
Decisionmakers for Patients Without Advance Directives: A Psychological
Critique, 42 GA. L. REV. 979, 994 (2008) (noting that this survey considered over
20,000 separate cases of disabled adults who were patients receiving health
care).
158. 6 ILL. JURISPRUDENCE PROBATE, ESTATES AND TRUSTS § 42:01
(Matthew Bender & Co. 2015); see also Estate of Barr, 492 N.E.2d 1241, 1246
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (stating that the disabled person’s sister, his limited
guardian, had no self-serving motives but was concerned with his financial
welfare).
159. Sulmasy and Snyder, supra note 143, at 1524.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1534. In considering a decision, a guardian will likely rely on
“current conversations, the guardian’s knowledge of the incapacitated person’s
values and preferences, and what others told the guardian about the
incapacitated person’s values and preferences.” Id.
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while a professional guardian would consider a more pragmatic
utilization of an estate.163
The standards used to govern the effectiveness of a guardian
are more stringent for a professional guardian than a family
guardian.164 For instance, courts hold that professional guardians
are held to a higher standard due to their profit motives in lieu of a
bloodline connection, while courts are more reluctant to have
burdensome standards placed on family guardians due to their
“good Samaritan” status.165 Family guardians make the argument
that if they were held to the same standard as a professional
guardian then their decisions and recommendations made on behalf
of the disabled adult might receive more support from the court. 166
The discretion a court uses in adopting a recommendation by a
guardian is based on the decision-making approach to be used as
proscribed by statute and the relationship of a guardian to the
disabled adult.167

B. Consequences of Neglect and Abandonment
Under the Rules of Intestacy
Scholars suggest that the primary role of intestacy is to
distribute the assets of one who dies intestate in a manner that the
decedent would have opted for had a will been effectuated. 168 On the
other hand, a family-oriented inheritance system that falls short of
considering the deceased’s intent, prior relationship with the heirs,
or the amount of support paid or affection given, is a flawed system
that requires statutory reform.169 For example, in a majority of
states a parent that abandons his or her child shall still receive an
inheritance from the abandoned child’s estate. 170 And even though
all states may disinherit an heir that slays the decedent, only a
small handful of states punish an heir for misconduct such as abuse
or financial exploitation of a disabled person.171 A state’s hesitation
163. See Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.
C. L. REV. 199, 205-6 (2001)(arguing that the family paradigm’s true function in
utilizing inheritance law is to preserve the family unit, not necessarily to
support an individual).
164. Boxx and Hammond, supra note 9, at 1235.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1236.
167. See supra Part III.A.
168. See Rhodes, supra note 83, at 518 n. 12 (citing Allison Dunham, The
Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. L.
REV. 241 (1963)).
169. See Foster, supra note 163, at 204, 222 (stating that proposed reforms
fall short of meeting the needs that social welfare demands due to a familyoriented inheritance system).
170. For a list of states that do exclude abandoning parents from
inheritance, see Rhodes, supra note 73, at 983.
171. See id. at 976 (discussing the slayer statute); id. at 986 n. 48 (listing
states that bar inheritance for conviction for abuse).
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to enact statutes that limit inheritance for misconduct or
abandonment reflects the legislature’s intent not to disrupt the
family model of inheritance; however, this creates a diminished
allocable share among non-abandoning and deserving heirs because
misbehaving heirs are apportioned part of the same estate. 172
1. Abandonment of a Child
There are only eleven jurisdictions, Illinois included, which has
enacted a statute that disinherits a parent from receiving an
abandoned child’s estate.173 Based on the abandoning parent
statute within Illinois specifically, 174 a parent that normally would
be entitled to their deceased child’s inheritance may not receive
anything where the parent either did not support the child or had
abandoned the child for more than a year immediately before the
child’s death.175
When the case of Estate of Howell was heard, Donald was no
longer a minor thus the abandonment statute could not apply, 176
however the fact that Donald Bernard abandoned Donald during his
first eighteen years of his life merits a discussion of the
abandonment and neglect statutes. The facts surrounding Donald
Bernard’s abandonment shows that he was in jail for thirteen of the
first fifteen years of Donald’s life, was not significantly involved in
Donald’s minor life after his release, and contributed a small total
amount of $400 for support during Donald’s childhood.177
Illinois and South Carolina are the only two states where a
judge may consider the circumstances of the abandonment,
including abandonment or failure to support the disabled adult, to
determine how much of the inheritance is owed to the parent. 178 The
policy backing his law is to allows a minor’s wishes and interests to
influence the judge’s decision on what the abandoning parent may
receive..179 For example, if Donald had passed before attaining the
age of majority, the court would consider how much influence would
Donald Bernard’s single contribution of support or a brief visit with
172. Id. at 977.
173. Id. at 983.
174. See 755 ILCS 5/2-6.5 (2015) (stating that “[a] parent who . . . has
willfully deserted the minor or dependent child shall not receive any property,
benefit, or other interest by reason of death,” though the court can make
considerations in deciding how much to deduct from the parent’s a disabled
adult). For a list of all other state statutes regarding abandonment or neglect of
a child, see Rhodes, supra note 73, at 982-85.
175. 755 ILCS 5/2-6.5 (2015).
176. See 755 ILCS 5/2-6.5 (2015) (regarding the guardian and only the
deceased minor or dependent child); but see 755 ILCS 5/2-6.2 (2015) (permitting
heir liability where neglect and financial exploitation of a elderly or disabled
person is found by a preponderance of the evidence).
177. Estate of Howell v. Howell, 36 N.E.3d 293, 296 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
178. Rhodes, supra note 73, at 985 n.45-46.
179. Id. at 985.
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his son have in the judgment granting full, partial, or no
inheritance? Enactment of abandonment statutes can act as a
powerful tool to encourage supporting one’s children and to
maintain a strong parent and child bond, while punishing those who
do not conform to society’s idea of a modern supportive family.180
2. Abuse and Neglect of a Child or Disabled Person
Similar to Illinois’s child abandonment statute, a judge has
discretion in allowing a partial or full inheritance based on whether
the heir is convicted of abuse, financial exploitation, or neglect.181
There are several states that have statutes that may apply to
children, disabled adults, or both.182 The Illinois statute, however,
only applies to elder people or people with a disability. 183 Each
statute also has different requirements to be met—for example,
Maryland’s statute only applies if there is financial exploitation,
and Oregon’s statute does not bar inheritance where a conviction
occurred five years or more before the death of the decedent. 184 The
astounding fact is that only six jurisdictions have this type of
statute enacted;185 the majority of these particular jurisdictions may
disagree with the premise that “[t]he abusive behavior of those
targeting a vulnerable population merits a disinheritance.” 186 It is
time that each jurisdiction review their probate code to prevent
against such misbehavior.

180. See Rhodes, supra note 83, at 537 (quoting, “[a] statute specifically
excluding a willfully abandoning parent from participating in a deceased child’s
estate is undoubtedly a powerful and direct remedy to unfair distribution and
it should be included in all jurisdictions’ intestate provisions.”); Monopoli, supra
note 68, at 264-65 (stating that abandonment statutes helps to establish
paternity and to punish a parent for failure to acknowledge or support their
child).
181. 755 ILCS 5/2-6.2 (2015).
182. Rhodes, supra note 73, at 986 n.48-49.
183. See 755 ILCS 5/2-6.2(b)(2015)(stating that those “[p]ersons convicted of
financial exploitation, abuse, or neglect of an elderly person or a person with a
disability or persons person with a disability or persons who have been found
by a preponderance of the evidence to be civilly liable for financial exploitation”
are barred from inheritance).
184. Susan N. Gray, Symposium: The Uniform Probate Code: Remaking
American Succession Law: Article: The Probate Definition of Family: A Proposal
For Guided Discretion in Intestacy, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 787, 809-10 (2012).
185. Rhodes, supra note 73, at 986 n.48-49.
186. See Anne-Marie Rhodes, Blood and Behavior, 36 ACTEC L.J. 143, 17375 (2010) (summarizing the California legislature’s intent in enacting a statute
which disinheritances those who abuse elders).
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IV. ADVOCATING FOR NATIONWIDE RECOGNITION OF THE
HYBRID STANDARD AND EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULES OF
INTESTACY THAT BAR MISBEHAVING HEIRS
Not only does this proposal aim to tweak existing Illinois law,
this proposal mainly is to promote the aforementioned Illinois laws
as the most equitable set of laws in the United States that provide
for those in a situation similar to Donald and his family. Other
jurisdictions ought to consider the hierarchical standard and the
multiple statutes that disinherit misbehaving heirs in
contemplating their own probate laws in light of today’s less
stringent standards that was once historically placed on heirs based
solely on blood-relations.
Further, within Illinois and other states, there exists limited
case law and statutory guidance regarding how a guardian must act
when representing a disabled adult. 187 In reaching a decision, courts
must review conflicts of interest and a guardian’s authority to make
a decision,188 which can take time and disturb a long contemplated
and thought out decision that the guardian believes would be
necessary and fair. A guardian, especially a family guardian, is
given more statutory preference in their decisions due to their
supportive relationship with the disabled adult and knowledge of
the disabled adult’s tendencies and needs. Therefore, this proposal
also recommends that a family guardian always be nominated
instead of a professional guardian.

A. Guardians and Hierarchical Standard Proposal
Other states should take heed to Illinois’s hierarchical
approach because it promotes the policy that deserving heirs should
receive over misbehaving heirs based on today’s need for a strong
modern family. Today, the Illinois legislature is proactive in staying
current with ensuring policies expressed in case law is reflected in
the probate code. Illinois has revised their law to allow disabled
adults without testamentary capacity to create a will or codicil. 189
Creating a trust under the Illinois statute also ensures that
guardians in certain circumstances have unequivocal power in
187. Whitton and Frolik, supra note 111, at 1534.
188. Boni-Saenz, supra note 42, at 1274. It is not always clear when the
judges need to evaluate a decision in order to approval it. Id. For example, they
may evaluate tax effects and gifting from an estate but judges may be
incompetent to evaluate a more personal decision when the judge is neither
aware of underlying facts nor can clearly ascertain the disabled adult’s desires.
Id.
189. 755 ILCS 2/11a-18(d-5) (2016). The statute allows for wards to make a
will if they are under guardianship, or otherwise the ward can make a will upon
showing a physician’s report stating that the ward has testamentary capacity.
This legislation was passed soon after Estate of Howell was heard.
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decision-making where the court need not assess the decision. 190
Illinois can also consider changing the newest statute and allow
more express decision-making powers to guardians for enacting
trusts or other estate planning instruments.
Illinois can consider adding more guidelines to the statute. For
example, if the guardian can prove no one else is in a better position
to have been appointed then he or she may create certain trusts or
wills excluding family members, where those excluded family
members may petition the court only after the disabled adult’s
death to be a beneficiary of the granting instrument. Implementing
these minor changes in laws will grant wider latitude in creating
estate plans for disabled people, as well as remove procedural
hurdles for the guardian and increase efficiency within the court
system.

B. Preference of Family Guardians Over Professional
Guardians
The Illinois Probate Act was fashioned so if the disabled adult’s
wishes could not be ascertained then the guardian would need to
make the best decision.191 This makes the court’s appointment of
the proper guardian very important because the court gives
discretion to the guardian’s decision-making procedure, including a
guardian’s decision to nominate his or herself as beneficiary of the
ward’s estate. Thus, in appointing a guardian, the court should
envision whether a particular guardian beneficiary will engage in a
good faith fiduciary relationship with the disabled adult;192 this
ensures that the disabled adult is taken care of and in return society
views the guardian’s beneficiary interest as equitable. In a situation
similar to Estate of Howell, the court should only be considering a
family guardian.193
190. In authorizing a guardian action, current law requires a petition that
“outline[s] the action or application of funds for which [the guardian] seeks
approval,” the results sought, and any tax savings to be accrued. The court may
also direct the guardian to give notice to all interested persons. Id. at 5/11a18(a-5).
191. Estate of Howell v. Howell, 36 N.E.3d 293, 300 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
192. Other considerations when appointing guardians include the “closeness
of relationship with the disabled adult (e.g., family or friend), familiarity with
the disabled adult’s wishes, proximity, professional experience and skills (e.g.,
nurse or social worker), reliability, availability, age, and health”. Sara Spitler,
Guardianship and Receivers, in CHANCERY AND SPECIAL REMEDIES § 10.10 (Ill.
Inst. for Cont. Legal Educ. 2013).
193. But see David Baker and Sarah Severson, Litigation in Illinois
Guardianships, in ESTATE, TRUST, AND GUARDIANSHIP LITIGATION § 16S.27
(describing a case where the court “refused to assume that a parent would be
preferred over a non-parent indicating that the statutory and case law
preferences for parents in minor guardianships would carry less weight in a
dispute regarding an adult guardianship) (citing In re Estate of Johnson, 284
Ill.App.3d 1080, 1091 (1996)).
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In making financial decisions on behalf of the disabled adult,
the family guardian typically considers other family member’s
views, consensus among family members, and what the guardian
would do in the disabled adult’s circumstances. 194 However, a
professional guardian relies on written directions and current
conversations gathered about the disabled adult. 195 A family
member who might have taken care of the disabled adult since birth
will have a better understanding of the disabled adult’s needs or
desires than a professional could ever gather during an
appointment. That concept can be seen in Estate of Howell, where
personal care and time spent with the cognitively disabled adult
cannot be replicated into document format for a professional to
thoroughly understand. For this reason, a family guardian should
always be appointed, when possible, as guardian for a disabled
adult who has been permanently disabled since birth.
Furthermore, a family guardian should be held to a lower
threshold for creating a financial decision for the disabled adult if it
is shown no one else could act on the disabled adult’s behalf as well
as the guardian and the general public would see the decision as
favorable in improving the disabled adult’s lifestyle needs. These
proposals facilitate the best of the hierarchical standard and
incentivize family guardians to take upmost care of the disabled
adult. The standard measuring potential neglect or abuse of the
financial decision should be a high burden on the party opposing the
decision. However, if the guardian did commit neglect or abuse,
then the punishment should be reducing or completely barring the
guardian’s inheritance in order to deter self-dealing behavior of
family guardians.

C. Rules of Intestacy and Abandoning Parent Proposal
As mentioned in the analysis and background, Illinois has
many statutes that disinherit non-deserving heirs. One statute that
should be revised is the one that provides for disinheritance based
on financial exploitation, abuse, or neglect of the disabled or the
elderly.196 Illinois should amend this statute to provide also for
children.197 Currently, there is only one jurisdiction that has
enacted statutes that provides for disinheritance for abuse of an
elder, disabled person, or child.198 While Illinois has a rule which

194. See Boxx and Hammond, supra note 9, at 1533.
195. Id.
196. 755 ILCS 5/2-6.2 (2015).
197. See Rhodes, supra note 73, at 986 n. 48-50 (noting the varying types of
abuse and neglect statutes that the handful of states have adopted).
198. See MD. CODE ANN, EST. & TRUSTS § 3-111 (West 2007) (barring a
parent’s inheritance from a child if, et al., the parent sexually abused or raped
the child); MD. CODE ANN, EST. & TRUSTS § 8-801(e) (West 2017) (disqualifying
a potential heir from inheritance if they, with fraud or deceit, obtain a disabled
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bars an heir from inheriting completely or partially for financial
exploitation, abuse, or neglect of a disabled adult, 199 and another
that bars a parent’s inheritance when he or she has neglected or
failed to support a child before the child’s death, 200 neither of these
can adequately protect one who is in the position of Donald. For full
protection of the estate, disabled adults need laws that protect the
estate from one who has defrauded or sexually abused the ward. 201
A proper solution would involve a synthesis of the Illinois
statutes pertaining to a parent neglecting a child and an heir
abusing a disabled adult, as well as implementing punishment for
the abandonment of a child or a disabled adult. If such a statute is
properly created, it would deter disinherited heirs from brining
lengthy will contests where they must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that they were wrongfully barred. 202 This is for two
reasons: first, not many will contests are brought in the first place,
and second, the disinherited heir’s character will have already
created a negative impression with the court and the heir may feel
that a chance of success does not exist.203 Such a statute should set
certain standards regarding whether an abandonment of a disabled
adult has occurred. The standard should adopt conditions referring
to the last time an heir paid support and continued to support the
heir,204 whether the court may deem that abandonment has indeed
occurred,205 and an agreement on a statutory definition of parent.206
The statutory definition of a parent should encourage the
public policy that blood parents may not always be entitled to an
inheritance. For example, a two-pronged definition of parent may
state, “the act of becoming a parent (birth or adoption) coupled with
the acts of being a parent (care and nurturing of the child).” 207
adult or elder person’s property and do not restore the property to its rightful
owner before the owner passes).
199. 755 ILCS 5/2-6.2 (2015).
200. 755 ILCS 5/2-6.5 (2015).
201. See Tate, supra note 69, at 142 (considering one’s power to disinherit
raises questions of undue influence, mental capacity, fraud, or duress, therefore
a check on testamentary freedom is merited).
202. Id. at 144.
203. See id. (stating that disinherited heirs would likely perceive the will as
being fair and would not want to further embarrass oneself by advocating for
change in the will.)
204. See e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-2 (2014) (stating a parent has a right in
a child’s inheritance “where the abandoning parent resumed its care and
maintenance at least one year prior to the death of the child and continued the
same until its death.”); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUST LAW § 4-1.4 (Consol. 2015)
(barring a parent from inheritance “unless the parental relationship and duties
are subsequently resumed and continue until the death of the child.”).
205. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.10(D)(2) (LexisNexis 2015) (requiring
an estate’s administrator to file for approval of adjudication of an abandoning
parent with the court before the parent is barred from inheritance).
206. Rhodes, supra note 83, at 517.
207. Id. This weight of this definition is divided between a direct familial
link and the policy view that a parent should act as a supportive and nurturing
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Applying this definition to Donald Bernard, there is no question
that he is the actual father of Donald, but a court would have to
decide whether his relationship and support with Donald aligns
with the second half of the proposed statutory definition. The
statute should also provide that facts and circumstances from the
disabled person’s child and adult life are admissible so that the
court is in the best position to hear any argument for or against the
adjudication of an abandoning parent.
The aim of the proposed statute is to upset the American view
of the family paradigm–the idea that closest related blood relatives
are always entitled to inheritance.208 This proposal promotes the
modern family, where opportunity and equality in estate planning
among preferred family members is promoted.209 The statute should
disallow a laughing heir from gaining a share of an estate, or one
who has never created a positive and supportive relationship with
the decedent.210 But, such a disruption of the historically accepted
yet outdated family paradigm seems to deter many state
legislatures to move forward and protect the vulnerable
individuals.211 Therefore, in creation of an inheritance barring
statute, a legislature must be aware of how a law would change
familial behavior and should thus create one that policy would deem
appropriate and that does not entirely infringe on familial ties.
Legislature can promote a shift in policy that focuses on an
individual’s right to distribute to close family members as he or she
sees fit while the court protects the estate from those who deserved
to be barred.212

V.

CONCLUSION

The ruling in Estate of Howell and the statutory adoption of the
hierarchical substituted judgment and best interest hybrid
parent. Id.
208. Proponents for the rules of intestacy argue that the distribution scheme
“take[s] into account the pattern of distribution that survivors would consider
fair” and so comports with provisions that “an average property owner would be
most apt to favor,” though scholars admit “where the social interest at stake is
of “overriding” importance” there is conflict with intestate decedents. Adam J.
Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of its Context,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1034-35 (2004).
209. Foster, supra note 163, at 240.
210. See id. (defining a laughing heir as one who laughs, as opposed to
grieves, upon the decedent’s passing because of realizing a windfall merely due
to blood ties).
211. See Rhodes, supra note 73, at 977 (referring to statutory bars to
inheritance, “[l]egislatures have not moved boldly in this area, perhaps
reflecting a general reluctance to wade too far into family matters, allowing a
zone of privacy for the day to day details of family affairs.”).
212. See Tate, supra note 69, at 159 (arguing that an individual’s right to
acquire and possess property also encompasses the right to devise the property
how he or she fits even if the decedent intended to disinherit another).
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standard affirm that Illinois has created legislation that permits
equitable treatment of disabled adults whose testamentary capacity
can never be manifested. While traditional laws that promote
intestacy or the decision-making ability of a guardian weigh down
some states, Illinois has proven with Estate of Howell that it is the
most progressive of any jurisdiction in dealing with issues regarding
guardianship and estate planning. To further an individual’s rights,
be it the rights of a minor, disabled adult, or guardian, a jurisdiction
should adopt statutes that give an opportunity for equal treatment
among those deserving of a loved one’s estate.
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